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Menihan 2
Historian and philosopher Michel Foucault’s intellectual focus experienced a great shift 
throughout the last four years of his life, from 1981-84. Deviating, to an extent, from his 
previous studies concerning epistemology and power, Foucault began to unravel the genealogy 
of the “Care of the Self,” uncovering, theorizing, and mapping the details and techniques of 
classical, philosophically driven self-care practices. By exploring Foucault’s lectures from this 
period compiled in The Hermeneutics of the Subject (1981-82) and The Courage of Truth (1983-
84), I will illustrate how Foucault uncovers the Classical and Hellenistic cultures of the self, the 
characteristics of which differ widely from those found in contemporary Western culture. By 
addressing ethics, the care of the self, the art of life, ascetics, and truth-speaking, I will discuss 
the ways in which the possibility of self-fashioned subjectivities was a widespread—at times 
even all encompassing—mode of existence in antiquity. I will then explain how Foucault’s 
lectures offer that the institutionalization of Christianity, the subsequent formation of pastoral 
power, and the increasing prevalence of scientific and academic discourses collectively 
functioned to phase out antiquity’s practices of self-finalizing subjectivity, and instead 
introduced into Western culture and thought an understanding that the self is already and always 
determined, and that its fashioning and formation is beyond the ability of the subject. 
Contemporary Western subjectivity thus appears to be limited and inescapable; however, I pose 
that, by turning towards ethics, the driving force of ancient philosophy’s self-care practices, the 
contemporary Western subject can escape the limits of subjectivation that have existed since the 
institutionalization of Christianity, and may instead form his own subjectivity through the 
possibility of an ethical mode of life. 
 Foucault begins his 1981-82 lectures in The Hermeneutics of the Subject by taking up 
antiquity’s momentously important philosophical practice of epimeleia heautou, “the care of the 
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self” (The Hermeneutics of the Subject 8). Epimeleaia heautou was paramount to Platonic, 
Socratic, Epicurean, and later Stoic and Cynic philosophical practice, as its various concepts, 
rules, and techniques “remained a fundamental principle for describing the philosophical attitude 
throughout Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman culture” (8). In antiquity, the care of the self involved 
a multitude of practices that were performed on the self, by the self, such as memorization, 
meditation, abstinence, and “examination of conscience” (11). Through examining its one-
thousand-year genealogy, Foucault illustrates that epimeleia heautou may be understood as not 
just a prevalent, widespread philosophical culture of antiquity, but as constituting a complex, 
multifaceted, and constantly changing framework of self-subjectivity. The most profound result 
of Foucault’s genealogical work throughout his lectures from 1981-84 in regard to epimeleia 
heautou rests in his descriptions of the transformation of antiquity’s care-of-self practices into 
“the first forms of Christian asceticism” (11). Practices of Christian asceticism began to change 
modes of Western subjectivity, and (as they later became paired with bio-political discourse of 
the 19th and 20th centuries) they have come to substantially affect contemporary epistemes of 
subjectivity. 
 By addressing Plato’s Alcibiades, Foucault points to epimeleia heautou’s early 
fundamental notions. In this text, Socrates exclaims, “One must care about oneself,” but quickly 
realizes that there are intrinsic intricacies and complications to work out within this expression. 
Foucault notes Socrates’ daunting query: “who knows exactly what “taking care of one’s self” 
is?” (Hermeneutics 51). Delving more intuitively into the predicament, Plato’s “text then 
naturally divides into two parts”: First, “what is this thing, this object, this self to which one must 
attend?” Second, “What form should this care take, in what must it consist?” (51). The general 
answer to the latter question will remain constant—although the specific practices will vary 
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depending on circumstance—throughout antiquity: The care of the self must consist of a tekhnē, 
a set of techniques performed by the self on the self (51). Likewise, the answer to the former 
inquiry is composed of a general constant thread throughout the period of antiquity in question. 
What is this object that one must care for? It is the “element which is the same on both the 
subject side and the object side” (53): “You have to take care of yourself: It is you who takes 
care; and then you take care of something which is the same thing as yourself, [the same thing] 
as the subject who “takes care,” this is your self as object” (53). However, the specifics of this 
answer—the specifics of “self”—prove quite malleable throughout Foucault’s lectures. 
 Proper governing was the aim of care-of-the-self practices in early Socratic dialogue. A 
young ruler must care for oneself, govern oneself, and do so ethically (I will return to the 
importance of this ethics) in order to properly care for and govern others as a ruler 
(Hermeneutics 51-52). Thus, the self one cares for in this instance is the self-as-governor, self-
as-ruler with the aim of being able to rule properly. In later Socratic dialogue regarding 
epimeleia heautou, however, the self for which one must care becomes one’s psukhē, one’s 
“soul” (53). In this later dialogue, Socrates illustrates that epimeleia heautou practices are no 
longer limited to the realm of young men associated with political governance, but have instead 
transcended to a more generally applicable philosophical practice: “in the Apology, for example,” 
Foucault explains, “Socrates says that he encourages his fellow citizens, and everyone he meets, 
to care for their soul (psukhē) in order to perfect it” (53, emphasis added). Notwithstanding, the 
care of the self in later Socratic dialogue is still a principle that is generally directed toward 
youth. As was the case with the young ruler, those who are directed to take care of themselves do 
so with the aim of reaching a perfected old age: “The young man will not take care of himself in 
order to become the citizen, or rather the leader who is needed. The adult must take care of 
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himself…to prepare…[f]or his old age” (75). There is a paramount point to be expounded upon 
in regard to this soul-as-object that must be cared for. By caring for the soul-as-object, one does 
not discover the “soul-substance” (as will become common with Christianity), but rather forms 
the soul-subject (57). Foucault clearly reiterates his understanding of the distinction: “It seems to 
me that the outcome of the argument of the Alcibiades on the question “what is oneself and what 
meaning should be given to oneself when we say that one should take care of the self?” is the 
soul as subject and not at all the soul as substance” (57). 
 By continuing to navigate the Alcibiades, Foucault points to another momentous concept 
that will prove substantially important throughout care-of-self practices of antiquity (as well as 
throughout future Christian ascetic practices, within realms of bio-political knowledge, and 
within the framework of contemporary subjectivity). What is the necessary first step of taking 
care of one’s self? Foucault explains the essential feature, asserting, “Well, quite simply, it 
consists in knowing oneself” (Hermeneutics 67). Epimeleia heautou—“care of the self”—is 
paired with, as well as necessarily accompanied by throughout antiquity, gnōthi seauton—
“knowledge of the self” (67), which is accessed by employing various pre-established 
philosophical practices: 
 
[I]t seems to me that by taking over and reintegrating a number of 
these prior, archaic, preexisting techniques, the whole movement 
of Platonic thought with regard to the care of the self is one of 
organizing them around and subordinating them to the great 
principle of know yourself. It is in order to know oneself that one 
must withdraw into the self; it is in order to know oneself that one 
must detach oneself from sensations which are the source of 
illusions; it is in order to know oneself that one must establish 
one’s soul in an immobile fixity which is not open to external 
events, etcetera. (Hermeneutics 68) 
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 Although gnōthi seauton plays a critical role in antiquity’s self-care practices (it was, 
indeed, “the major if not exclusive form of the care of the self” in the Alcibiades), the 
philosophical cultures that employed epimeleia heautou pursued aims and performed techniques 
that extended vastly beyond simple knowledge of the self and self-knowledge practices 
(Hermeneutics 82). The care of the self came to incorporate “autonomous, self-finalized 
practice[s]” that would comprise in some cases—in the Neo-Platonic movements, for example—
“the fundamental definition of philosophy” (86). In many instances of Classical and Hellenistic 
philosophy, the care of the self would come to incorporate and run parallel with “the famous 
tekhnē tou biou,” the art of life, the art of living (86). Unlike the care of the self depicted in 
Plato’s Alcibiades, the epimeleia heautou “was no longer a sort of preliminary condition for an 
art of living that would come later” (125), but was rather denoted by work on the self, by the self, 
“[a]nd the end of this practice of the self is the self,” all of which was practiced with the 
continual formation of the current self as the ultimate aim (126). 
This tekhnē tou biou, this “art of life,” was comprised of various practices exercised on 
the self by the self, and by which one continuously fashions oneself as subject (Hermeneutics 
11). As the tekhnē tou biou is carried out on the self, Foucault explains, the self will “actually be 
fashioned by himself as the object of his own care,” composing a self-formed subject 
(Hermeneutics 119). Knowledge continues to function as a prevalent concept in art-of-life 
practices throughout antiquity, for “[t]he theme that all the knowledge we need must be 
knowledge prescribed by the tekhnē tou biou is found equally in the Stoics, Epicureans, and 
Cynics” (Hermeneutics 259). The subject must find in himself the knowledge of “the truth of his 
being,” with which he will find “a mode of being, which is one of happiness and of every 
perfection of which he is capable” (Hermeneutics 308). One arrives upon the truth of one’s being 
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via practices of askēsis, “the progressive consideration or mastery over oneself” (“Technologies 
of the Self” 238). Askēsis, Foucault simply and definitively states, “equips, it provides” 
(Hermeneutics 320). Specifically, askēsis provides paraskeuē, a set of moves, practices, and 
abilities that will equip and prepare an individual for whatever difficulty he may encounter. 
Askēsis was entirely positive work for the Greeks, and was a personal choice with the purpose of 
giving one’s own life a certain value (“On the Genealogy of Ethics” 271). Attaining this art of 
life was accomplished via a multitude of fashions and practices, such as taking care of one’s 
physical health and properly attending to the needs of one’s property and family. Xenophon’s 
ascetic techniques, Foucault explains, included exercising knowledge of one’s home—both 
inside and out (“Genealogy” 269). Askēsis also included a fair amount of individual and social 
practices of intellectuality for the Greeks—studying, reading, writing, note taking, and letter 
writing were key. Additionally, askēsis occasionally entailed preparing for death or earthly 
hardship. Epictetus and Seneca devised an askēsis centered on exercises of the self in preparation 
of an event in which one would find oneself in deep deprivation. For example, their ascetic 
principles involved severely limiting one’s food and pleasure in preparation for a situation, such 
as prison, in which one is forced to exist deprived of such essential life-elements (“Genealogy” 
269). 
And this paraskeuē is itself made up of truth in the form of “logoi (discourses)”—truth that the 
subject firmly knows, has actually uttered, repeated, written, rewritten, and solidified eternally 
(Hermeneutics 322). Further, Foucault explains, “[a]s the word logos indicates, [true discourses] 
are propositions justified by reason. Justified by reason means that they are rational, that they are 
true and constitute acceptable principles of behavior” (Hermeneutics 323). The self was 
fashioned through practices of askēsis, which resulted in forming a complete, perfect, full 
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relationship with oneself, and produced a constant “self-transfiguration” (Hermeneutics 319). 
Askēsis was comprised of “practices of truth” that not only “b[ound the subject] to the truth,” but 
also to an acceptable and exemplary mode of existence (Hermeneutics 317).  
 Understanding only the interrelatedness of ancient askēsis and paraskeuē, however, does 
not fully explain the manner in which one would constitute himself as a subject of tekhnē tou 
biou. Further discussion of concepts relative to the above-mentioned “rational…principles of 
behavior” and subsequent acceptable mode of existence is entirely paramount in explaining the 
way in which askēsis functioned as only a facet of tekhnē tou biou. The full substance, function, 
and interrelatedness of tekhnē tou biou, epimeleia heautou, and ancient askēsis (as well as an 
associated aesthetics) may be most completely demonstrated by discussing them concurrently 
within the discourse of ethics. One of the driving forces behind epimeleia heautou is a 
relationship of the self to the self, which constitutes an artistic labor on the self by the self in 
order to obtain an acceptable and exemplary mode of life, an ethōs—a presentation to the world 
of a certain mode of being, an attractive life, an ethics. Foucault describes this ethical self-to-self 
relationship as consisting of four major aspects: the “ethical substance,” elements or a particular 
area of one’s life that are worked over by ethics; the “mode of subjectivation,” the manner in 
which the individual is “invited or incited” to recognize how they should exist morally; 
“asceticism” (askēsis), an activity of molding the self—simply, what techniques one is to execute 
in order to reach the fourth aspect, the “telos,” the ultimate goal and end (“Genealogy” 263). 
Within this framework, askēsis is labor—an artistic labor, an aesthetic labor—in the form of “an 
exercise of the self on the self by which one attempts to develop and transform oneself, and to 
attain a certain mode of being” (“The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom” 
282). “[T]he objective of ascesis in Antiquity,” Foucault concisely explains, “is in fact the 
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constitution of a full, perfect, and complete relationship of oneself to oneself,” which is apparent 
through one’s conduct and behavior (Hermeneutics 320). Thus, this “mode of being,” this ethical 
tekhnē tou biou is itself the telos of epimeleia heautou. The self works on the self in a 
continuous, aesthetically laborious manner, while the object and constant aim is the self, one’s 
life, one’s existence, which itself may be understood as a work of art, a canvas in need of 
constant ethical attention.  
 The care of the self continued to become even more generalized throughout antiquity. 
Epimeleia heautou became a staple of not only aristocratic circles geared towards philosophical 
practice, but also began to permeate the lower classes through the establishment of various 
philosophical “cults” (thus defined because they “often [contained] ritualized procedures”) and 
philosophical schools (Hermeneutics 114). Many groups were all encompassing, even allowing 
membership to those of “the most disadvantaged classes” (113-14): 
 
In most of the groups I am talking about, the distinctions between 
rich and poor, between someone high-born and someone from an 
obscure family, or between someone who exercises political power 
and someone who lives in obscurity, were in principle not 
endorsed, recognized, or accepted…it seems that most of these 
groups did not accept even the distinction between a free man and 
a slave, in theory at least. (Hermeneutics 118) 
 
 
Virtually all men were theoretically competent and capable of epimeleia heautou. Although 
Foucault explains that this principle was only achieved by a few (“[l]ack of courage, strength, or 
endurance” usually prevailed), “[t]he care of the self is expressed as an unqualified principle,” 
meaning that it may apply to and be practiced by everyone, regardless of 
“status…[or]…technical, professional, or social aim” (118, 126). And not only was the care of 
the self no longer limited by social qualifications, it became a practice that extended well beyond 
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a practice of youth. There was a tekhnē for epimeleia heautou that applied to a range of ages, 
from youth to old age, “[a]nd the epimeleia heautou, now that its scale encompasses the whole of 
life, consists in educating oneself through all of one’s misfortunes” (439). Self-forming practices 
involving the relationship between self-as-object and self-as-subject greatly permeated the 
philosophies of the first and second centuries A.D., during which time Western civilization 
“arrive[d] at a culture of the self, a practice of the self of considerable proportions, with 
extremely rich forms…” (316). 
 Throughout his 1983-84 lectures compiled in The Courage of Truth, Foucault dedicates 
significant attention to Cynicism, exemplifying, describing, and detailing a widespread and 
entirely nonexclusive philosophical school of antiquity. Cynicism may be understood as “a sort 
of universal philosophy which is valid for and accessible to everyone” (200). In order to practice 
Cynicism, one did not require an elevated cultural or social status, nor formal schooling, training, 
or apprenticeship, nor any extensive regiment (198). Instead, Cynicism was “universal, entirely 
natural, and demand[ed] no study” because its aims could be accomplished by simply 
“choos[ing] what is decent out of desire for virtue and aversion to vice” (200). All have or can 
easily acquire knowledge of the basic philosophical notions and virtues driving Cynicism, thus 
in-depth instruction or a multitude of texts were not required (201). Cynicism considered all men 
philosophers by way of their very nature, by birth, and its “discourses and interventions were 
addressed to a wide and consequently not very cultured public, and its recruits came from outside 
the educated elites who usually practiced philosophy” (202). Cynic philosophy was simple, easy, 
normal, and practical, and offered what was considered, as Foucault explains, “a short cut to 
virtue,” “the quick way to virtue” from which no one was excluded (206). 
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 As with the aforementioned philosophical schools of antiquity, Cynicism was based 
around practices of truth. Cynic philosophy included parrhēsia, “truth-telling,” “freedom of 
speech,” which was directly incorporated in the Cynic’s mode of life (Courage 169). The Cynic 
spoke freely, and lived a life that consisted totally of, and fully exemplified, truth. In order to 
“play the role of truth teller,” the Cynic must renounce all attachments and desires that extend 
beyond mere natural necessity (170), and must live the life which is only truly essential. Thus, 
the Cynic donned the beggar’s attire and position, standing at temples and on street corners 
wearing rags, a beard, and nothing more than sandals or bare feet (203, 170). Foucault notes that 
“the mode of life (staff, beggar’s pouch, poverty, roaming, begging) has very precise functions in 
relation to this parrhēsia, this truth-tellling”—specifically, he explains, “[t]he mode of life is…a 
condition of possibility of this parrhēsia” (171). If one speaks freely and truthfully, one may 
adopt and exemplify a life of truth, for Cynicism makes “the form of existence an essential 
condition of truth-telling…[and] it makes the form of existence a way of making truth itself 
visible in one’s acts, one’s body, the way one dresses, and in the way one conducts oneself and 
lives” (172). At its essence, Cynicism is directly linked with practices of truth-telling, which 
themselves allow the Cynic to live a life of truth. Yet, the true life one lives is itself a parrhēsia, 
a truth-telling, in that it is an utter exemplification of what is true and natural and what is only 
and undeniably necessary (217). Additionally, the Cynic’s life is also true in that it is never 
hidden and “does not harbor any shadowy part” (221). This “unconcealed life” is also shameless 
of what it presents, for what it presents is always truth. A life that is entirely visible depicts what 
is entirely true and natural, and a life that was true and natural is entirely good (254).  
 Despite their beggarly attributes, the Cynics considered themselves to exemplify a 
beautiful existence through the true life that they sought and the truth-telling that it exhibited 
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(Courage 165). As with the previously mentioned philosophical schools and practices of 
antiquity, the desired Cynic mode of life was achieved via “the way of exercise, of askēsis, of 
practices of destitution and endurance” (207). Through minimizing desires, possessions, 
consumption, social status, and virtually all other aspects of existence that extend beyond what is 
essential and naturally necessary, the Cynic developed a “difficult, arduous” mode of being that 
points to the very essence of askēsis—“truth as discipline…and bareness of life” (207, 173). And 
as with other philosophies of antiquity, Cynicism—by way of true discourse, askēsis, virtue, and 
a specific epimeleia heautou—produced its very own exemplary ethics, for “[a] true life is the 
life which allows its ethōs to be easily recognized” (223 f.). Despite its slovenly characteristics, 
Cynicism projected a life that was moral, ethical, and therefore beautiful by way of its mode and 
practices, denoting yet another instantiation of a certain art of life fashioned by the self through 
modes of truth, a fully self-finalized self-subjectivation. 
 The Cynics minimized their lives to the level of revealed and shameless natural necessity 
by practicing numerous tests of self. The aim of such tests was to “simply reveal[] what life is in 
its independence, its fundamental freedom, and consequently…what life ought to be” (Courage 
171). In order to answer such tests and attain the true life, Cynic practice revolved around the 
metaphoric imperatives: “alter your currency” or “change the value of your currency,” in which 
one’s life was equated to the effigy on a coin (241). This notion of alteration—“parakharaxon to 
nomisma (revalue your currency, alter your currency, change its value)”—was not just “regarded 
as a principle of life,” but, Foucault asserts, was considered “the most fundamental and typical 
Cynic principle” (241). Along with the imperative “know yourself” (accomplished through 
establishing one’s life as a life of truth), revaluing one’s life was the most paramount underlying 
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aim of Cynic philosophical practice (241). Foucault clarifies the interconnection between “know 
yourself” and parakharaxon to nomisma, and takes note of their interaction’s subsequent end: 
 
[T]he fundamental precept is “revalue your currency”; but this 
revaluation can only take place through and by means of “know 
yourself,” which replaces the counterfeit currency of one’s own 
and others’ opinion of oneself, with the true currency of self-
knowledge. One can handle one’s own existence, take care of 
oneself as something real, and have the true currency of one’s true 




By discovering knowledge of self through converting oneself and one’s life to truth, one may 
change the very value of his existence from a “counterfeit” value to “true currency.” This 
revaluating self-morphing arises through one’s own accumulation of self-knowledge via actions 
of the self. And, most momentously, the ability to fashion oneself as the effigy of one’s true 
currency rests solely in “one’s hands.” Through the fundamental Cynic practice parakharaxon to 
nomisma, Foucault describes a philosophical mode of antiquity in which one may fully change 
one’s existence from that which is “counterfeit” to that which is nothing less than naturally 
necessary, positive, and wholly true—that which is ethical, beautiful, and exemplary of an 
aesthetic existence resulting from a self-fashioning driven by ascetic practices. 
 Foucault additionally sheds light upon an interpretation of this principle that describes the 
aim as more than just breaking from the untrue self. Parakharaxon to nomisma may be further 
understood as breaking from convention, from custom, and from established practices of 
society—“breaking up the rules, habits, conventions, and laws” (Courage 242). The conventions 
which one breaks from may be equated to the untrue, the false, the “counterfeit,” and the 
breaking from them may be seen as an instantiation, formation, and establishment of the true 
value of one’s life. The Cynic’s life is replaced by one that is other, better, and more adequate, 
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and the result marks a paramount uncovering of Foucault’s last lectures. This “other life (vie 
autre)” allows access to the “other world (l’autre monde)”—by living an ethical and truthful life, 
the Cynic is able to access a world of actual, natural truth which is other than that which is 
believed to be true (245). This true other world that breaks from normal social practice, custom, 
and belief is at the very fingertips of the Cynic philosopher. And as Cynicism was entirely 
nonexclusive, easy to practice, and thus prevalent throughout various cultures and social classes, 
we find a culture of the self, a practice of art and beauty, a vast practice of self-subjectivating 
ethics within antiquity in which individuals from all walks of society could access an other life 
and an other world through nothing more than their own practices of askēsis. Through his 
treatment of the Cynics, Foucault describes a philosophical culture and practice of antiquity in 
which anyone and everyone had the power to alter their self and their world by forming not only 
a self and world that are other, but the self and world that are true. Foucault’s uncovering is 
monumental, for he illuminates a time in Western culture in which one had the ability to create 
not only one’s self, but one’s world. Self was understood as malleable, fashionable, as a canvas, 
as a project, and by altering this self, one could form a world which was true and other than what 
was prior, a world that was no longer “counterfeit,” conforming, standard, or within the confines 
of social and cultural limitations. The Cynics could break from that which seems real, absolute, 
and definite, and could thus form a reality of self that was true in actuality. 
 But such concepts and processes have been phased out of Western thought. With the 
formation of Christianity and its instantiation of pastoral power, antiquity’s philosophical notions 
of self-knowledge, care of the self, ascetic practices, the soul, the other life, and the other world 
underwent radical transformations. Foucault traces care-of-self practices from Socrates, to the 
Cynics, to early Christian practices of the third and fourth centuries (Hermeneutics 10). 
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Hesitantly, and apparently for lack of a better term, Foucault points to the “Cartesian moment,” 
which denotes a shift from antiquity’s conception of gnōthi seauton, epimeleia heautou, truth, 
parrhēsia, and the associated modes of life and ascetic practices to Christian and then modern 
conceptualizations (14). The “moment” is better understood, Foucault clarifies, as a 
transformation rather than a single event, for “the disengagement, the separation, was a slow 
process” (27). As an ultimate result, knowledge of the truth of oneself came to dominate Western 
thought and culture, but askēsis as a wholly positive practice and the means to an art of life has 
been phased out. 
 Many philosophical schools of antiquity incorporated salvation practices. In Platonic 
dialogue, for example, “one must be saved, one must save oneself, in order to save others” 
(Hermeneutics 180). The dialogue found in the Alcibiades clearly depicts this concept, as therein 
the young aristocrat must save himself from an immoral, unethical life in order to govern 
properly, which would in turn save his subjects from unethical rule. In order to maintain his 
ethical state, the ruler must continuously work upon the self through a continual salvation that 
requires constant attention, and which is subsequently and always being produced. After 
Platonism—during the later Hellenistic and Roman philosophies—salvation continued to 
represent a self-effected, -forming, and -finalizing act: “One saves oneself for the self, one is 
saved by the self, one saves oneself in order to arrive at nothing other than oneself” (185). In 
Christianity, however, “salvation normally appears in a binary system…situated between this 
world and the other. Salvation effectuates a crossing over” (181). Whereas the salvation of 
antiquity came from constant and continual attention to the self in the form of askēsis, salvation 
as it is understood in Christianity (as well as modern culture) came to be understood as a quick 
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shift or switch, “something that brings about passage,” such as from impurity to purity or evil to 
good (181).  
 The singular sudden change that the Christian experiences following salvation is known 
as metanoia, a conversion. There is a swift alteration from one mode of being to another, from 
one life to another. Unlike the continual self-care practices of antiquity in which the self 
constantly forms the self as subject, Christian metanoia “can only be conversion inasmuch as a 
break takes place in the subject” (Hermeneutics 211). Whereas self-care philosophical practices 
of antiquity brought one closer to one as subject and strengthened the relationship between self 
and self—denoting the concept of epistrophē in which one essentially returns to the source of 
one’s soul (217)—Christian metanoia separates self from self in a singular instant. Earlier self-
care practices do incorporate a separation as in Christianity, although not at all a “break” 
between self and self: “The break must be carried out with what surrounds the self so that it is no 
longer enslaved, dependent, and constrained…but which is not a break of the self with the self” 
(212, emphasis added). Foucault clearly and effectively differentiates between these two distinct 
relationships of the self by ascribing the term “trans-subjectivation” to the concept of Christian 
metanoia, for it does not at all describe a self-fashioning practice, but rather a new subjectivation 
as the result of a complete detachment from self (214), and by ascribing the term “self-
subjectivation” to the self-to-self relationships of antiquity wherein one constantly and 
continuously fashions oneself as the object and subject of one’s own practices (214). The 
epistrophē clearly indicates a return to self, a strengthening of the relationship between self and 
self, whereas Christian metanoia “involes a drastic change of the mind, a radical renewal…a sort 
of rebirth…with death and resurrection at the heart of this as an experience of oneself…” (216). 
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 Like the previous philosophical schools of antiquity, Christian conversion of self 
incorporated and revolved around self-knowledge and truth. In early Christianity, one must 
accept the truth that is the product of pastoral power—that which is passed down from the 
institution through its texts and preachers—if one is to reach salvation, be transformed, and thus 
be saved (Hermeneutics 255). Also passed down from pastoral power is the notion that one may 
only attain the truth of self by deciphering one’s inner soul. No longer does one care for the soul-
as-object in order to form the soul-as-subject, but the Christian must now interpret the soul-
substance in order to uncover the inherent truth of self (255). One must recognize the nature of 
one’s soul in order to “dispel internal illusions, to recognize the temptations that arise within the 
soul and the heart [such as the devil’s nefarious and misleading messages], and also to thwart the 
seductions to which [one] may be victim” (255-56). With the ancients, the soul could be reached, 
engaged with, and aesthetically formed, but with Christianity the soul is suspect and must be 
corrected. Christianity’s associated truth-telling principles also come to differ quite drastically 
from those of the ancient philosophies, as confession varies significantly from the preceding 
Greek practices of parrhēsia. In the latter, the truth-speaker did so in order to live the life of 
truth, to constitute himself as the object and exemplification of truth, and, most importantly, 
parrhēsia, as with all self-care practice of antiquity, was an entirely positive, productive act. 
Christian confession, on the other hand, was not done to form oneself but was rather a 
prerequisite for the trans-subjectivation of conversion, and was not at all a positive act, but 
instead focused upon one’s internal negativity, one’s faults, one’s sins. Additionally, unlike 
ancient parrhēsia, Christian confession was not a choice, but was rather performed due to 
demands of the religious institution and pastoral power—it was “a necessary element in the 
individual’s membership of a community [wherein] refusal to confess at least once a year was 
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grounds for excommunication” (364). One of the most substantial differences between Greco-
Roman philosophy and Christianity—one of the most paramount results of the “considerable 
switch…considerable mutation” between these diametrically opposed self-care practices—is 
rooted in the ultimate aim of self-knowledge and practices of self. Simply, for the ancients, the 
aim of epimeleia heautou was the constitution of self, whereas the aim of the Christian self-care 
practices described just above—discovering the truth of one’s soul, asceticism, confession—was 
self-renunciation (407). “In sum,” Foucault explains, “I think we can suggest the following” 
(332): 
 
[T]he meaning and function of philosophical ascesis…in the 
Hellenistic and Roman epoch is essentially to ensure what I will 
call the subjectivation of true discourse. It ensures that I myself can 
hold this true discourse, it ensures that I myself become the subject 
of enunciation of true discourse, whereas it seems to me that 
Christian ascesis will have a completely different function, which 
is, of course, self-renunciation…It seems to me that in this 
Christian ascesis there is…a movement of self-reunciation which 
proceeds by way of, and whose essential moment is, the 
objectification of the self in a true discourse. It seems to me that 
pagan ascesis…involves coming together with oneself, the 
essential moment of which is not the objectification of the self in a 
true discourse, but the subjectivation of a true discourse in a 




Whereas ancient askēsis involved the formation of, and deeper, continual relationship with, the 
self based on a true life, Christian ascetics involved discovering the truth about oneself in order 
to renounce the self—an “exegesis of the self” (Hermeneutics 256). Christian asceticism includes 
deciphering one’s thoughts, what temptations flow within one’s mind and through oneself, and 
whether or not they are influenced by God or the devil. The Christian searches for faults within 
the self with the intention of discovering them then disavowing them, renouncing their inner self 
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by “flush[ing] out and explor[ing] the secrets of [ones] conscience” (218). This self-renunciation 
is “one of the most fundamental axes of Christian asceticism,” Foucault asserts, because it is 
precisely the action required for gaining access to “the other life, to the light, to truth and 
salvation” (250). As opposed to interpreting what makes up the self, askēsis, on the other hand, 
involves “acquiring something we do not have,” gaining tools and techniques of the self to 
prepare oneself for anything and everything that life may present. If the aim of Christian 
asceticism is to renounce, remove, and reduce, then it exemplifies a concept antithetical to 
askēsis, which “equips [and] provides” (320). 
 Early Christianity existed alongside Cynicism, from which it appears to have possibly 
adopted concepts and practices. In his lectures, Foucault points to the “links between Cynicism 
and Christianity,” yet focuses more on their differences, on Christianity’s break from ancient 
philosophical practices of the self. Cynic practices of askēsis, Foucault explains, seem to have 
permeated Christian asceticism: “the bareness of life as a way of constituting the body itself as 
the visible theatre of truth, seems to have been…a theme throughout the long history of 
Christianity” (Courage 181, 183). In philosophical practices of antiquity the Other (the 
philosophical instructor or companion) assisted one in his practices of askēsis by offering truths, 
suggestions, tools, and techniques for forming the self and an art of life. Within Christianity, on 
the other hand, pastoral power prevailed. The Christian Other (the priest) forced actions upon the 
ascetic, and functioned as both a preacher and disciplinarian with firm instructions from above 
(whether from God or the institution). The Christian ascetic needed to discover and renounce the 
truth of himself in the face of such powers, and felt the need to comply fully with pastoral orders, 
for the Christian came “to fear God and recognize the necessity of submitting to His will, and to 
the will of those who represent Him” (333). Whereas Cynic parrhēsia denoted a positive, 
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assertive, fearless practice of strength—a “parrhēsia-confidence”—Christian truth-telling 
became “the principle of trembling obedience” and fearful negativity (333). Foucault further 
enunciates the developing ties between Cynicism and early Christianity: “what we see emerging 
through Cynicism is the matrix of what has been a significant form of life throughout the 
Christian…tradition, that is to say, the matrix of a life dedicated to the manifestation of truth in 
fact [and] to veridiction, truth-telling, the manifestation of the truth through discourse” (315). 
The significant difference, however, lies in the ultimate aim of such discourses of truth. The 
Cynic intends to change his existence and his world by a return to the truth of self via practices 
on the self, by the self, in which the formation of a more beautiful, better equipped self is the 
ultimate aim. The Christian likewise seeks another life, another world, but does so not by 
returning to the truth of self, forming the self, or working on the self, but rather the only way to 
salvation for the Christian ascetic is through renunciation of the self, an absolute break from the 
self.  
Clearly, early Christianity subscribed to notions of vi autre and l’autre monde, yet with 
diametrically different aims and means of achievement. Christianity emphasized “a relation to 
the other world (l’autre monde), and not to the world which is other,” meaning that, unlike 
Cynicism, Christianity did not look to transform the current world, but to depart from it 
(Courage 319). Christian practices did not seek “the other world” (l’autre monde) which is a 
transformation of the current world, but “an other world” (un monde autre), reached only by 
departure from self and this world (319). For the ancients, the true life—that of art, of truth-
speaking, of moral and ethical exemplification—offered a means to access a world that was 
other, a world here and now that was not an escape from self and one’s surroundings, but which 
was rather the result of an even closer self-to-self relationship. For Christianity, however, the 
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true life did not entail access to a world that was other, but rather focused on reaching another 
world. 
Notions of the self, self-care practices, truth, and self-knowledge have proven both 
variable and malleable throughout the philosophical schools of antiquity. However, Christianity 
has profoundly altered such ideas and practices, as asceticism became a negative practice and the 
self became a substance to be discovered and disavowed, rather than aestheticized and formed. 
The very notion of forming one’s own subjectivity through a self-fashioning was entirely 
replaced by the obligation to speak the truth of oneself to pastoral power and answer to the 
religious institution in a practice that is marked by fear and obedience. Foucault accurately 
describes epimeleia heautou as “a body of work defining a way of being…which makes it an 
extremely important phenomenon…in the history of subjectivity itself, or, if you like, in the 
history of practices of subjectivity” (Hermeneutics 11). But this philosophical phenomenon was 
altered and ultimately phased out by practices of Christian ascetics. The Western understanding 
of “care of the self” has thus been transformed from a positive to a negative practice, from 
practices that once formed ethical, artistic, morally sound ways of life, to the obligation of 
necessary self-discovery and -disavowal: “we have the paradox of a precept of care of the self 
which signifies for us either egoism or withdrawal, but which for centuries was rather a positive 
principle that was the matrix for extremely strict moralities” (13).  
The “Cartesian moment” is additionally marked by alterations in the understanding of 
self-knowledge and truth that continue to permeate contemporary thought. The “Cartesian 
moment” marks the beginning of “a different age of the history of relations between subjectivity 
and truth,” which has been influenced by, in addition to practices of Christian asceticisim, 
continual developments in scientific knowledge (Hermeneutics 18). Truth-telling practices were 
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not only institutionalized through the Catholic Church, but also through various developing 
academic and scientific schools. Whereas Christianity has played a substantial role in the 
disappearance of ancient practices of epimeleia heautou, “a normed, regulated, established 
science embodied in institutions[] has no doubt been the other major reason for the 
disappearance of the theme of the true life as a philosophical question, as a problem of the 
conditions of access to the truth” (Courage 235). As scientific schools and the knowledge they 
produced began to flood Western society, other means of access to “true knowledge” were 
subsequently pushed out. Truth became understood as attainable through scientific and academic 
practices, thus living the “true life as the necessary basis for the practice of truth-telling 
disappears” (235). Even within philosophical discourses, Foucault asserts, “the question of the 
philosophical life has continued to be, I won’t say forgotten, but neglected” (236): 
 
[I]t has constantly appeared as surplus in relation to philosophy, to 
a philosophical practice indexed to the scientific model. The 
question of the philosophical life has constantly appeared like a 
shadow of philosophical practice, and increasingly pointless. This 
neglect of the philosophical life has meant that it is now possible 
for the relation to truth to be validated and manifested in no other 
form than that of scientific knowledge. (Courage 236) 
 
 
Through various sciences, such as psychology, psychiatry, and, most notably, psychoanalysis, 
truth could be found and spoken through discovering what is inherent in one’s inner substance. 
The latter science—psychoanalysis—has had substantially profound effects on Western 
subjectivity, for its founder, Sigmund Freud, developed extensive practices for identifying, 
defining, labeling and otherwise forming the subjectivity of his patients. Much as in Christian 
asceticism, Freud turned all attention to one’s inner self, what resided within to be discovered, 
worked over, and corrected. In psychoanalysis, the subject is formed through discourses that 
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discover, identify, and label his inner substance, and subjectivities are, as in Christianity, at the 
mercy of those speaking such discourses, for the knower of the truth, the psychoanalyst, has 
inherited a position similar to pastoral power. 
 Modern practices of self-subjectivation have adopted early-Christian notions of “discover 
the truth of yourself,” soul-as-substance, and self-renunciation. Meanwhile, epimeleia heautou 
and tekhnē tou biou as modes for fashioning the self have been “omitted, or at least left in the 
shadow” (Hermeneutics 12). Modern subjectivity does not include antique practices of self-
formation, but rather has been dominated by negative self-deciphering techniques brought forth 
by “forms of knowledge developed later in the Christian world and the modern world” 
(Hermeneutics 253). Modern Western thought relies upon discovering the truth of oneself, 
“one’s inner self,” and “coming to terms with oneself,” the result of which is more often than not 
geared towards self-acceptance or -correction. School children, for example, abide by the 
imperative “be yourself,” never “form yourself.” Notions of truth changed during the sixteenth 
century, Foucault explains, as the importance of scientific knowledge began to surpass that of 
spiritual knowledge (Hermeneutics 309). Modern practices of subjectivity and truth have left by 
the wayside the concept of fashioning oneself through ethics and an art of life. Instead—since the 
birth of academic and scientific discourses which began to identify, group, and label individuals 
by certain physical and psychological characteristics—the Western subject expresses the truth of 
himself solely in terms of scientific knowledge and the understanding of a preexisting inner-self. 
The changes resulting from this shift in practices of subjectivity are paramount, for Foucault 
clearly notes that “the task of having to discover and tell of the soul’s being” “will leave its mark 
in the entire history of our thoughts” (Courage 161). 
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In contemporary Western thought, there is no other way to truth than through scientific 
knowledge (Courage 237). Thus, the self may only be understood in terms of science, and may 
no longer be understood as a work of art, an ethical canvas in constant formation. Further, 
science is understood as constant; thus, the self that is understood through scientific discourse 
has been discovered, definitively identified, and permanently labeled. Clearly, Western practices 
of subjectivity have unarguably broken from that which they once were. In antiquity, he who 
practiced self-subjectivation was free—free to form the self in any manner he desired, free to 
work on the self constantly as if his life was a canvas in need of constant attention, which 
resulted in an exemplary ethōs that was beautiful and true. In contemporary Western society, 
however, practices of subjectivity function not as harbingers of freedom, but as modes of 
imprisonment.  
Throughout centuries of Western Civilization a relationship between self-as-object and 
self-as-subject dominated philosophical discourse. At times throughout the culture of the self, all 
ages, all classes, anybody, and everybody could practice self-forming techniques, and all could 
thus equip themselves for every necessity that one may require. Classical Western practices of 
self-subjectivity included exercises in which one may change one’s very value of existence from 
that which is “counterfeit” and untrue to that which is nothing less than naturally necessary, 
positive, and wholly true—that which is ethical and beautiful. The opportunity to fashion a self 
that is other, better, and more adequate than that which one is—a self that could break from 
convention, customs, and rules, habits, laws, perceptions, and the consensual beliefs of society—
has been widely available throughout various times, schools, and locations of Western culture. 
The question thus becomes: May modern Western society once again establish practices of the 
self that will disavow the limits of contemporary subjectivity? May one arrive at a point in which 
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a self-fashioning becomes the only form of subjectivity and thus free oneself from the prison of 
contemporary self-knowledge? “Is it possible,” Foucault asks, “to constitute, or reconstitute, an 
aesthetics of the self?” (251). 
Foucault clearly explains that the culture of the self and self-care practices of antiquity 
may not simply be reapplied to contemporary Western society. When asked whether “the Greeks 
offer an attractive and plausible alternative” to contemporary Western culture, he emphatically 
responds: “No!...you can’t find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem 
raised at another moment by other people” (“Genealogy” 256). However, an awareness of the 
past that illustrates that the limitations imposed upon Western subjectivity are not as definite as 
they may appear, an awareness that acknowledges that other modes and forms of self-
subjectivation are possible within Western thought and society, is extremely substantial to the the 
contemporary Western subject. “[T]here is no exemplary value in a period that is not our own,” 
but examples exist of a time when practices of Western subjectivity were radically different than 
they are today, a time when the Western subject was not defined, limited, and constrained by 
scientific knowledge, notions of an immutable inner substance, and binding truths of self (259). 
We may not be able to reinstate our past, “[b]ut we do have an example of an ethical experience” 
that we may consider as a possibility for contemporary existence (259). The major problem lies, 
however, in that the notion of the ethical life as the means by which one may form his own 
subjectivity has been almost entirely forced from Western culture and thought (274). With 
institutionalized Christianity, the renunciation of the self replaced the formation of the self, and 
the problem of purification, confession, deciphering the truth of oneself, and disclosing truth 
inherent in oneself replaced the self-subjectivating culture of antiquity. Yet, much as the 
“Cartesian moment” is not marked by a single event or date, the culture of the self did not simply 
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disappear from Western civilization with the institutionalization of Christianity: “You may find 
elements that have simply been integrated, displaced, reutilized in Christianity [such as the 
aforementioned Cynic characteristics]” (277). Although “the classical care of the self…lost a 
large part of its autonomy,” Western society has been witness to sporadic uprisings of ethical 
self-care practices, such as through certain Renaissance religious groups, as well as impressive 
instances of ethical, artistic modes of life and self-formation found in, for example, the literary 
works, speeches, and diaries of Virginia Woolf (278). The culture of the self has long since 
vanished from Western society, but forms of its practices still remain as accomplishable 
possibilities. 
In contemporary Western society, the notion of “the care of the self” has been replaced 
by the imperative “know yourself,” thus limitations of self-subjectivation prevail, and the ability 
for self-formation lacks. Western thought has firmly adopted the idea that the “self” is an 
inherent substance to be discovered, thus the notion of self-formed subjectivities seems generally 
improbable, if not impossible. Therefore, in order to disavow such limitations, and instead open 
vast possibilities of self-formation and subjectivity, the individual member of Western society 
must relinquish the imperative “know yourself” and all of its links to academic, scientific, 
psychoanalytical, and pastoral “truths” and discourses, and must instead adopt practices related 
to one’s care of the self (“Technologies” 226). As noted just above, the care of the self is not a 
concept that has ceased to exist since the “Cartesian moment,” it is a contemporary potentiality 
that has sprung up occasionally and has produced substantial ends in terms of subjectivity 
throughout the centuries since Christianity. So, can ideas of care of the self that resemble, mimic, 
or are even quasi-reinstantiations of those of the classical Greek and Roman epochs once again 
occupy Western society? “Absolutely,” Foucault offers, but he is exceedingly quick to explain 
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further, noting that it will not suffice “just to say, “We have unfortunately forgotten about the 
care of the self; so here, here it is, the key to everything”” (“Concern” 294). The West may, 
however, turn to the examples found in its history for insight into the possibilities for 
contemporary modes of life. 
Although the culture and care of the self in their totality cannot adequately be reactivated 
within contemporary Western culture, an art of life may be considered an adequate means of 
transcending the limitations of contemporary subjectivity. Considering Western society’s past—
marked by consecutive centuries in which one’s life, one’s whole mode of existence, could be 
understood as a work of aesthetics—what Foucault finds intriguing is “that, in our society, art 
has become something that is related only to objects and not to individuals or to life” 
(“Genealogy” 261). Ideas of the soul and self as objects to be worked over much as canvases in 
need of constant artistic attention have long since transformed into notions of the inherent inner 
soul-as-substance, the formation of which is beyond the control of its associated subject. The 
soul and self are considered to be handed down, placed, or otherwise come to occupy their 
spaces by forces that are beyond the subject’s control (by the hands of God, by nature, by 
“truths” spoken by scientific and academic discourses). Thus, if the Western individual begins to 
disavow the concept of soul-substance, and instead subscribes to the notion that the self-as-object 
and the self-as-subject may exist and function concurrently, and may be formed continually, then 
the art of life begins to become a possible contemporary mode of self-subjectivity. If the Western 
individual indeed disavows the notion of self-as-substance, and instead subscribes to notions of 
the self-as-object to be worked over aesthetically, then, Foucault explains, “[f]rom the idea that 
the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create 
ourselves as a work of art” (“Genealogy” 262, emphasis added). Perhaps the exact practices, 
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modes of life, drives, aims, and ends of antiquity’s culture of the self cannot be reinstated into 
contemporary Western society, but, Foucault bluntly and rhetorically poses, “[C]ouldn’t 
everyone’s life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art object but not 
our life?” (“Genealogy” 261). 
Likewise, may not ethics and the relationship one has with oneself underlie this art of 
life? Surely, but again, the specific concepts, thoughts, and practices of antiquity regarding the 
ethical self-to-self relationship may not simply be reinstated. To form an ethical self-to-self 
relationship, the contemporary Western subject must first overcome the prevailing, Christianity-
inspired understandings of morals and ethics that are entirely different from their ancient 
counterparts. Morals and their associated ethical actions in contemporary Western society are 
guidelines that are defined and structured around the treatment of others, not practices normally 
attributed to the self. The Western subject has inherited the Christian notion that one must 
renounce the self, thus applying morals and ethics to the self as a means of forming the self is 
seen, to an extent, as an action opposite from that which is required, as a “means of escape from 
all the rules” (“Technologies” 228). However, much as the care of the self has not entirely 
disappeared from Western culture, still embedded within the moral code is the important 
“relationship you ought to have with yourself…which [Foucault] call[s] ethics, and which 
determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own 
actions” (“Genealogy” 263). 
By returning to Foucault’s four aspects of ethics, it becomes apparent that the ethical life 
does not just hold on as a theoretical possibility, but may rather be consider a contemporary 
mode of existence open to all members of Western society. As with the Cynics, the 
contemporary ethical mode of life may apply to any and all Western subjects, any situation, 
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anytime, anywhere, and may be exercised in innumerable manners, for various aims, and may 
subsequently produce countless and singular ends. Foucault’s four aspects of ethics are entirely 
dependent upon the subject, their aims, and the period of time in which they live. They are so 
dependent upon the individual and their situation that they may be defined in any way that the 
subject sees fit. The first aspect is, again, the “ethical substance”—that which is going to be 
worked over by ethics—which is singularly malleable and adaptable to the individual in 
question: “It’s not always the same part of ourselves or of our behavior, which is relevant for 
ethical judgment” (“Genealogy” 263). The second aspect, the “mode of subjectivation,” the way 
that the individual is “invited or incited to recognize their moral obligations,” also changes on a 
situational basis, and thus may surely apply to any and all contemporary subjects: “Is it,” 
Foucault asks, “divine law that has been revealed in a text?...Is it a rational rule? Is it the attempt 
to give your existence the most beautiful form possible?” (“Genealogy” 264). Likewise, the third 
aspect, “asceticism,” the work that one does to constitute the self as a subject of ethics, to form 
an ethical life, also varies because it is dependent upon the first two aspects. Lastly, the forth 
element of ethics, the “telos,” the aim of an ethical life, what one desires to become as the result 
of such ethical practice, is of course as shifting as the three aspects needed to attain it: “[S]hall 
we become pure, or immortal, or free, or masters of ourselves, and so on?” (“Genealogy” 265).  
There is no question that Foucault’s four elements of ethics may, in some manner, 
function within contemporary society, that is, of course, if the subject can overcome the notion 
that the self is not something to be treated ethically. If this contemporary roadblock concerning 
self-renunciation may be overcome, then the Western individual may no doubt attempt an ethical 
mode of life in its entirety. Subsequently, “the subject as a subject of ethical actions” may once 
again be seen as a possible form of contemporary Western subjectivity (“Genealogy” 266). As a 
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result, the Western subject no longer must be he who is determined by severely limiting 
institutional practices, scientific and academic knowledge and discourses, labels, pastoral power, 
and the “truth-speaking” in regards to oneself that such forces demand. Instead, through an 
ethical mode of being, the contemporary Western subject may fully disavow the knowledge and 
“truth” of self presented to him by various institutions and belief systems, and become, instead, 
he who is the subject of his relationship to himself, the self-formed subject of his own actions, 
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